The Mind and the Brain — Alfred Binet
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Title : The Mind and the Brain Author : Alfred Binet Release date : April 14, 2007 [eBook #21077] Language : English Other information and formats : www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/21077 Credits : E-text prepared by Curtis Weyant, Sankar Viswanathan, and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Digital Case, the Kelvin Smith Library, Case Western Reserve University (http://library.case.edu/digitalcase/) *** START OF pgdp.net ) from page images generously made available by Digital Case, the Kelvin Smith Library, Case Western Reserve University ( http://library.case.edu/digitalcase/ ) Note: Images of the original pages are available through Digital Case, the Kelvin Smith Library, Case Western Reserve University. See http://digitalcase.case.edu:9000/fedora/get/ksl:binmin00/binmin00.pdf Transcriber's Note: References are made to footnotes in other footnotes and index. The footnotes are serially numbered and placed at the end of each chapter. Consequently the references in the footnotes and index have been corrected to indicate the footnote number. International Scientific Series. VOLUME LXXXIX. ( The International Scientific Series ) Edited by F. Legge THE MIND AND THE BRAIN BY ALFRED BINET Directeur du Laboratoire de Psychologie à la Sorbonne BEING THE AUTHORISED TRANSLATION OF L'ÂME ET LE CORPS LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO. L TD DRYDEN HOUSE, GERRARD STREET, W. 1907 CONTENTS PAGE BOOK I The Definition of Matter CHAPTER I Introduction The distinction between mind and matter—Knowable not homogeneous—Criterion employed, enumeration not concepts 3 CHAPTER II Our Knowledge of External Objects only Sensation Modern theories of matter—Outer world only known to us by our sensations—Instances—Mill's approval of proposition, and its defects—Nervous system only intermediary between self and outer world—The great X of Matter—Nervous system does not give us true image—Müller's law of specificity of the nerves—The nervous system itself a sensation—Relations of sensation with the unknowable the affair of metaphysics 10 CHAPTER III The Mechanical Theories of Matter are only Symbols Physicists vainly endeavour to reduce the rôle of sensation—Mathematical, energetical, and mechanical theories of universe—Mechanical model formed from sensation—Instance of tuning-fork—No one sensation any right to hegemony over others 27 CHAPTER IV Answers to some Objections, and Summary Objections of spiritualists—Of German authors who contend that nervous system does give true image—Of metaphysicians—Common ground of objection that nervous system not intermediary—Answer to this—Summary of preceding chapters 44 BOOK II The Definition of Mind CHAPTER I The Distinction between Cognition and its Object Necessity for inventory of mental phenomena—Objects of cognition and acts of cognition—Definition of consciousness 55 CHAPTER II Definition of Sensation Sensation defined by experimental psychology—A state of consciousness—Considered self-evident by Mill, Renouvier, and Hume—Psycho-physical according to Reid and Hamilton—Reasons in favour of last definition—Other opinions examined and refuted 60 CHAPTER III Definition of the Image Perception and ideation cannot be separated—Perception constituted by addition of image to sensation—Hallucinations—Objections anticipated and answered 76 CHAPTER IV Definition of the Emotions Contrary opinions as to nature of emotions—Emotion a phenomenon sui generis —Intellectualist theory of emotion supported by Lange and James—Is emotion only a perception? Is effort?—Question left unanswered 88 CHAPTER V Definition of the Consciousness—The Relation Subject-Object Can thoughts be divided into subject and object?—This division cannot apply to the consciousness—Subject of cognition itself an object—James' opinion examined—Opinion that subject is spiritual substance and consciousness its faculty refuted 96 CHAPTER VI Definition of the Consciousness—Categories of the Understanding Principle of relativity doubted—Tables of categories: Aristotle, Kant, and Renouvier—Kantian idealism—Phenomenism of Berkeley examined and rejected—Argument of a priorists —The intelligence only an inactive consciousness—Huxley's epiphenomenal consciousness—Is the consciousness necessary?—Impossibility of answering this question 103 CHAPTER VII Definition of the Consciousness—The Separability of the Consciousness from its Object—Discussion of Idealism Can the consciousness be separated from its object?—Idealists consider the object a modality of the consciousness and thus inseparable, from it—Futility of this doctrine—Object can exist without consciousness 119 CHAPTER VIII Definition of the Consciousness—The Separation of the Consciousness from its object—The Unconscious Can ideas exist without consciousness?—No consciousness without an object—Can the consciousness die?—Enfeeblement of consciousness how accounted for—Doubling of consciousness in hysterics—Relations of physiological phenomena to consciousness—Consciousness cannot become unconscious and yet exist 126 CHAPTER IX Definitions of Psychology Difficulty of defining psychology—Definition by substance—Psychology not the science of the soul—Definition by enumeration: its error—Definition by method contradicts idea of consciousness—Externospection and introspection sometimes confused—Definition by content—Facts cannot be divided into those of consciousness and of unconsciousness—Descartes' definition of psychology insufficient—"Within and without" simile unanalogous—Definition by point of view—Inconsistencies of Ebbinghaus' contention—W. James' teleological theory—Definition by the peculiar nature of