Reformed Logic A System Based on Berkeley's Philosophy with an Entirely New Method of Dialectic — D. B. McLachlan
B. McLachlan You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org . If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook. Title : Reformed Logic Author : D. B. McLachlan Release date : August 31, 2016 [eBook #52945] Most recently updated: October 23, 2024 Language : English Other information and formats : www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52945 Credits : E-text prepared by deaurider, Lesley Halamek, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org) *** START OF B. McLachlan Note: Images of the original pages are available through Internet Archive. See https://archive.org/details/reformedlogicsys00mclarich REFORMED LOGIC Oxford HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY B. McLachlan REFORMED LOGIC A SYSTEM BASED ON BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY WITH AN ENTIRELY NEW METHOD OF DIALECTIC BY D. B. McLACHLAN ' Spirits are active, indivisible substances; Ideas [objects] are inert, fleeting, dependent things, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances....The cause of Ideas is an incorporeal active Substance or Spirit.' — Berkeley. London SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. PATERNOSTER SQUARE 1892 [ All rights reserved ] ' Looking to the chaotic state of logic text-books at the present time, one would be inclined to say that there does not exist anywhere a recognised, currently-received body of speculation to which the title Logic can be unambiguously assigned, and that we must therefore resign the hope of attaining by any empirical consideration of the received doctrine, a precise determination of the nature and limits of logical theory. ' Encyc. Brit. , Art., Logic . PREFACE The object of the following treatise is to give an intelligible account of the principal facts of Mind, with a method for the right expression and criticism of Reasoning. It is based on principles not before applied to such a purpose. The current systems of Metaphysic are obscure and difficult simply because they start from false premises, not because the nature and operations of Mind cannot, if properly understood, be made as comprehensible to beginners as other branches of knowledge. The rules of Dialectic are quite within the capacity of any intelligent schoolboy, and should be an essential part of early education, like Arithmetic. Let not the student be repelled at finding a philosophy reputed to be one of the most difficult taken as the basis of this work. It is Berkeleyism considerably modified. Also it is to be borne in mind that a philosophy is not to be judged by its primâ facie probability, but by its power of explaining many facts in a coherent and lucid way. A theory that does this should not be rejected for a seeming paradox at the outset. Most of the theoretical and all the dialectical parts of this work can be adapted to Realistic thinking, by treating the judgments of the two Berkeleyan categories as intuitions instead of inferences. CONTENTS PAGE. Preface v Introduction sect. i Division of Philosophies into Ideal and Substantial—Substantial subdivided into Mental and Material—Berkeley's philosophy a Mental Substantialism 1 ii Ontological principles essential to logical theory—Mind consists of (at least) Self and a Plastic Substance—Functions of each—Perception of Inorganic things discussed—Berkeley's view on this point rejected—Body to be considered an apparatus of Perception 4 iii Current Metaphysic is Ideal and therefore incoherent—Substantial alone has a connecting principle—Importance of Categories in Substantialism—Its doctrine of Reason totally different from the Academic 8 Intellect iv Origin of Intellect—Its use—Difference between Sentimental and Intellectual consciousness—Intellect not the governing intelligence of Man—Moral education the most important 11 v Truth, its various meanings—Veracity—Correct Ideation—Correct Inference—No absolute standard of Truth— Nisi utile est, quod novimus, stulta est Sapentia —Schopenhauer on the function of Intellect 14 vi Standard of Truth relating to Bodily welfare different from that relating to Mental welfare—Realism the theory of Perception under the former standard—Its main dogmas—Cause why it is superseded—Superstition of One Truth—Realism and Substantialism both true and yet contradictory 18 Perception vii Defined, according to Substantial principles—Noumenon—Subject—Object—Sentiment not excited by Objects, but Objects accompany Sentiments—Subject not passive in Perception— Attention —Kant's opinion on the inconceivability of Noumena refuted—Difficulty of overcoming Realistic prejudices—Science of little use in Philosophy 23 Ideas viii How produced—Hume's notion untenable—No innate Ideas—but Sentiment is innate—Division of Ideas into Particular, General, and Imaginary 27 ix Memory — Oblivion — Recollection —Images, how preserved and how lost—Good Memory not necessarily advantageous—Recovery of the apparently Forgotten—Sudden extinction of Ideas—'Decay of the mind' in old age—Memory inexplicable on any theory but the Substantial—John Stuart Mill's confession—Memory the chief fact of Mental Science 28 x Sentiments may be remembered—Feelings and Emotions—No detailed analysis of Sentiments possible or necessary—Spinoza's list—Can sentiments be noumenally excited without objects? 34 xi Analysis of Comparison—It is the principle of Generalisation and Imagination 36 Generalisation xii Purpose of Generalisation—Objects classified must be similar and have similar utilities—Inferiority of general ideas acquired by definition—Names not essential to general thought—Generalisation resembles composite photography—Classification on mere objective resemblance—neat but superficial—Conceptualism 38 xiii Matter the most general notion derived from Objects—Belief in Real Matter a