The Theory of Moral Sentiments — Adam Smith
You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org . If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook. Title : The Theory of Moral Sentiments Author : Adam Smith Release date : February 9, 2022 [eBook #67363] Most recently updated: October 18, 2024 Language : English Original publication : Ireland: J. Beatty and C. Jackson, 1777 Other information and formats : www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67363 Credits : Richard Tonsing and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive) *** START OF THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS; OR, AN ESSAY TOWARDS An Analysis of the Principles by which Men naturally judge concerning the Conduct and Character , first of their Neighbours , and afterwards of THEMSELVES . TO WHICH IS ADDED, A DISSERTATION ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGES. By ADAM SMITH, L.L.D. F.R.S. Formerly Professor of Philosophy in the University of Glasgow; and Author of the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations. THE SIXTH EDITION. DUBLIN: Printed for J. Beatty and C. Jackson , No. 32, Skinner-Row . M,DCC,LXXVII. PART I. O f the Propriety of Action. SECTION I. Of the sense of propriety Page 1 . Chap. I. Of Sympathy ibid. Chap. II. Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy 9 Chap. III. Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with our own 14 Chap. IV. The same subject continued 19 Chap. V. Of the amiable and respectable virtues 27 SECTION II. Of the degrees of the different passions which are consistent with propriety 33 Chap. I. Of the passions which take their origin from the body 34 Chap. II. Of those passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the imagination 41 Chap. III. Of the unsocial passions 46 Chap. IV. Of the social passions 54 Chap. V. Of the selfish passions 58 SECTION III. Of the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgment of mankind with regard to the propriety of action; and why it is more easy to obtain their approbation in the one state than in the other 64 Chap. I. That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned ibid. Chap. II. Of the origin of ambition, and of the distinction of ranks 74 Chap. III. Of the stoical philosophy 89 PART II. Of Merit and Demerit; or of the objects of reward and punishment. SECTION I. Of the sense of merit and demerit 97 Chap. I. That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment 98 Chap. II. Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment 102 Chap. III. That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it 106 Chap. IV. Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters 109 Chap. V. The analysis of the sense of merit and demerit 112 SECTION II. Of justice and beneficence 119 Chap. I. Comparison of those two virtues ibid. Chap. II. Of the sense of justice, of remorse, and of the consciousness of merit 126 Chap. III. Of the utility of this constitution of nature 132 SECTION III. Of the influence of fortune upon the sentiments of mankind, with regard to the merit or demerit of actions 145 Chap. I. Of the causes of this influence of fortune 148 Chap. II. Of the extent of this influence of fortune 154 Chap. III. Of the final cause of this irregularity of sentiments 167 PART III. Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty. Chap. I. Of the consciousness of merited praise or blame 173 Chap. II. In what manner our own judgments refer to what ought to be the judgments of others: and of the origin of general rules 180 Chap. III. Of the influence and authority of the general rules of morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of the Deity 207 Chap. IV. In what cases the sense of duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives 223 PART IV. Of the effect of utility upon the sentiments of approbation. Chap. I. Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of art, and of the extensive influence of this species of beauty 237 Chap. II. Of the beauty which the appearance of utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation 250 PART V. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation. Chap. I. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon our notions of beauty and deformity 261 Chap. II. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon moral sentiments 271 PART VI. Of Systems of Moral Philosophy. SECTION I. Of the questions which ought to be examined in a theory of moral sentiments 291 SECTION II. Of the different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue 294 Chap. I. Of those systems which make virtue consist in propriety 295 Chap. II. Of those systems which make virtue consist in prudence 311 Chap. III. Of those systems which make virtue consist in benevolence 321 Chap. IV. Of licentious systems 331 SECTION III. Of the different systems which have been formed concerning the principle of approbation 345 Chap. I. Of those systems which deduce the principle of approbati