The Federalist Papers — Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay
The Federalist Papers | Project Gutenberg You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org . If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook. Title : The Federalist Papers Author : Alexander Hamilton John Jay James Madison Release date : August 1, 1991 [eBook #18] Most recently updated: October 11, 2025 Language : English Other information and formats : www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18 *** START OF I. General Introduction FEDERALIST No. II. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence FEDERALIST No. III. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) FEDERALIST No. IV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) FEDERALIST No. V. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) FEDERALIST No. VI. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States FEDERALIST No. VII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) FEDERALIST No. VIII. The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States FEDERALIST No. IX. The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection FEDERALIST No. X. The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) FEDERALIST No. XI. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy FEDERALIST No. XII. The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue FEDERALIST No. XIII. Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government FEDERALIST No. XIV. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered FEDERALIST No. XV. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union FEDERALIST No. XVI. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) FEDERALIST No. XVII. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) FEDERALIST No. XVIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) FEDERALIST No. XIX. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) FEDERALIST No. XX. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) FEDERALIST No. XXI. Other Defects of the Present Confederation FEDERALIST No. XXII. The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation) FEDERALIST No. XXIII. The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union FEDERALIST No. XXIV. The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered FEDERALIST No. XXV. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered) FEDERALIST No. XXVI. The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered. FEDERALIST No. XXVII. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) FEDERALIST No. XXVIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) FEDERALIST No. XXIX. Concerning the Militia FEDERALIST No. XXX. Concerning the General Power of Taxation FEDERALIST No. XXXI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXIII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXIV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXVI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXVII. Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government. FEDERALIST No. XXXVIII. The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed. FEDERALIST No. XXXIX. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles FEDERALIST No. XL. On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained. FEDERALIST No. XLI. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution FEDERALIST No. XLII. The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered FEDERALIST No. XLIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) FEDERALIST No. XLIV. Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States FEDERALIST No. XLV. The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments. FEDERALIST No. XLVI. The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared FEDERALIST No. XLVII. The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts. FEDERALIST No. XLVIII. These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other. FEDERALIST No. XLIX. Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention. FEDERALIST No. L. Periodical Appeals to the People Considered FEDERALIST No. LI. The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments. FEDERALIST No. LII. The House of Representatives FEDERALIST No. LIII. The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) FEDERALIST No. LIV. The Apportionment of Members Among the States FEDERALIST No. LV. The Total Number of the House of Representatives FEDERALIST No. LVI. The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives) FEDERALIST No. LVII. The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation. FEDERAL