Reconceptualising Objectivity through Aristotelian Virtues in Science — Epoche C2
Research Note: The Indivisibility of Value in Scientific Practice The discourse surrounding values in science has long been shaped by the influential contextual empiricism of Helen Longino, particularly her seminal work, Science as Social Knowledge (1990). Longino's compelling argument posits that non-epistemic values – those pertaining to social, ethical, or political concerns – are not merely permissible but often essential to the sound functioning of scientific inquiry. Far from undermining objectivity, she contends, these values, when subjected to critical discourse within a diverse scientific community, contribute to the very robustness and reliability of scientific knowledge. This perspective has largely settled the debate for many, establishing a nuanced framework where the distinction between epistemic values (e.g., accuracy, consistency, scope) and non-epistemic values remains analytically distinct, even if intertwined in practice. However, this note seeks to challenge the enduring utility of this epistemic/non-epistemic dichotomy, particularly when viewed through the lens of a reinterpreted Aristotelian virtue ethics. Our central insight is that, in specific contexts of scientific practice, this very distinction breaks down, compelling a reconceptualisation of scientific objectivity as a more intricate socio-cultural construct. This has profound implications for how we conceive of normative guidance and explanatory models within scientific endeavour. The Spatiality of Virtue: From the Madrasa to the Laboratory Consider the traditional Islamic scholarly environment, such as the madrasa or the House of Wisdom (Bayt al-Ḥikma) in Abbasid Baghdad. Here, the pursuit of knowledge ( ilm ) was inextricably linked with the cultivation of moral virtues ( akhlaq ). The scholar ( alim ) was not merely a repository of facts but a paragon of intellectual honesty, humility, perseverance, and a deep sense of responsibility towards the community ( umma ). The very space of learning – the quiet contemplation within the library, the rigorous debate in the assembly – fostered an environment where the pursuit of truth was seen as a moral imperative, a devotional act. In this context, the 'epistemic' value of, say, logical coherence or explanatory power, cannot be neatly separated from the 'non-epistemic' value of intellectual humility or the ethical commitment to serve humanity through knowledge. The scholar's judgement in interpreting a complex text, such as a commentary ( sharh ) on Avicenna's Canon of Medicine , was not solely an exercise in epistemic reasoning. It was also deeply informed by a moral disposition towards truthfulness ( sidq ), a sense of justice ( adl ) in attributing ideas, and a profound awareness of the social consequences of their interpretations. The rhetorical tradition, heavily influenced by poetry and a layered hermeneutics, further blurred these lines; the elegance and persuasive power of an argument (ostensibly a non-epistemic aesthetic value) were often seen as indicative of its underlying truth (an epistemic value). Let us map this onto contemporary scientific practice. When a climate scientist chooses a particular model for projecting future warming, or an epidemiologist decides on the appropriate level of statistical significance for a public health intervention, are these choices purely 'epistemic'? Longino would argue that non-epistemic values are legitimately involved, guiding the interpretation of ambiguous data or the selection of research priorities. Our reinterpretation, however, suggests something more radical: the virtues cultivated within the scientific community – virtues like intellectual courage in challenging established paradigms, integrity in data reporting, or a judiciousness in weighing evidence under uncertainty – are not merely external constraints on epistemic reasoning, but constitutive elements of it. The Interpenetration of Values: A Virtuous Epistemology The Aristotelian concept of phronesis , or practical wisdom, is crucial here. Phronesis is not merely technical skill ( techne ) nor theoretical knowledge ( episteme ); it is the capacity to deliberate well about what is good for human beings, to discern the right means to achieve noble ends. In the context of science, a 'virtuous scientist' does not simply apply epistemic norms mechanically. Rather, their judgement, their choice of methodology, their interpretation of data, and even their formulation of hypotheses are deeply infused with virtues that transcend the epistemic/non-epistemic divide. Consider the virtue of 'rigour'. Is rigour purely an epistemic value, related to methodological precision and logical validity? Or does it also encompass a non-epistemic commitment to honesty, meticulousness, and a refusal to cut corners, stemming from an ethical responsibility towards the integrity of knowledge and its public utility? Similarly, 'openness to criticism' is undeniably an epistemic virtue, fostering self-correction and progress. Yet, it also demands intellectual humility, a non-epistemic virtue that allows one to acknowledge error and learn from others, rather than clinging to personal bias or ego. The traditional Islamic emphasis on commentary ( tafsir , sharh ) and the intricate interweaving of textual interpretation with moral guidance provides a powerful analogy. A commentator's work was not just about establishing the literal meaning; it was about revealing its deeper wisdom and ethical implications. The 'truth' of a text was multi-layered, encompassing both its factual accuracy and its moral resonance. In science, too, the 'truth' of a finding might involve not just its empirical verification but also its ethical implications, its societal impact, and the virtuous character of its production. This reinterpretation suggests that what Longino identifies as the legitimate role of non-epistemic values is, in fact, the manifestation of virtue-laden scientific practice where the very d