A Performative Account of Tragic Emotion — Epoche C2
Introduction: The Paradox of Fictional Emotion The experience of profound emotional response to fictional narratives, particularly the distress elicited by tragedy, presents a persistent paradox in aesthetics. How can we genuinely weep for Anna Karenina or feel terror at the plight of Oedipus, knowing full well that these characters and their sufferings are not real? A prominent explanation, largely stemming from cognitivist traditions, posits that such emotions are best understood through the lens of 'make-believe'. Kendall Walton's seminal work, Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990), offers a sophisticated articulation of this view, suggesting that audiences engage with fictional worlds by participating in games of make-believe, where they imagine themselves in certain scenarios and thus experience 'quasi-emotions' or 'fictional emotions' rather than genuine ones. While acknowledging the explanatory power of Walton's framework in certain respects, particularly in accounting for the voluntary nature of engagement, this note argues that it ultimately falls short in fully capturing the 'reality' of emotional distress in tragedy, reducing fictional events to mere objects of imagination and thereby overlooking a crucial performative dimension. Critique of the Make-Believe Framework Walton's theory, in essence, proposes that when we engage with a fictional tragedy, we are not truly saddened by the death of a character, but rather, it is fictional that we are saddened. We are prescribed to imagine certain states of affairs, and our responses are thus part of a game. For instance, a reader of King Lear might imagine that Lear is suffering, and in that imagined context, it is fictional that they feel pity. The core challenge to this view arises when considering the visceral, often involuntary, nature of emotional responses to tragedy. The tears shed, the racing heart, the genuine sense of loss – these do not always feel like mere pretend emotions. If our emotional engagement is purely a matter of make-believe, why do these emotions often feel as potent and real as those triggered by actual events? One primary objection to the make-believe account is its difficulty in explaining the depth and authenticity of audience suffering. If fictional events are merely objects of imagination, then our distress should logically be commensurately 'imagined' or attenuated. However, the phenomenological experience frequently contradicts this. Consider the following points of contention: Authenticity of Suffering: The grief experienced for a tragic character often mirrors the grief for a real person, albeit without the same practical implications. The make-believe framework struggles to account for this qualitative similarity. Involuntary Response: While initial engagement with fiction might be voluntary, emotional responses, especially distress, can feel involuntary and overwhelming, defying the idea of a 'game' where one can simply choose to stop 'playing'. Therapeutic and Cathartic Effects: The widely acknowledged cathartic or therapeutic effects of tragedy suggest a deeper, more genuine emotional processing than mere make-believe would permit. If emotions are not real, how can they be purged or processed? Walton acknowledges that these fictional emotions can be 'about' real emotions, or that they can be 'felt' in a certain way, but the distinction often feels like a semantic manoeuvre to preserve the theoretical purity of make-believe without fully addressing the lived experience of profound distress. A Performative Theory of Fiction To overcome these limitations, I propose that a performative theory of fiction offers a more robust explanation for the audience's emotional responses, particularly in tragedy. This perspective shifts focus from the fictional content as merely an object of imagination to the inherent performativity in the creation and reception of fictional works. Drawing inspiration from speech act theory and performance studies, a performative theory argues that fiction does not merely represent; it does . The literary work, the theatrical play, or the film is not just a description of events, but an event in itself – a performative act designed to elicit specific responses from an audience. In this view, the author, director, or artist performs a 'tragedy' for the audience, and the audience, in turn, performs their role as spectators. This performance is not a mere simulation but a real-world interaction structured by cultural conventions and aesthetic expectations. The distress we feel is not 'fictional' but a genuine affective response to a real-world performative act. The mechanism of emotion elicitation can be understood as follows: The Performative Act: The work of fiction itself constitutes a performative act by the artist, designed to evoke certain emotional states. This act is real, occurring in the shared space between creator and audience. Audience Participation: The audience actively participates in this performative act, not merely by imagining, but by allowing themselves to be affected. This participation is a real-world engagement, not a game of make-believe. Emotional Contagion and Empathy: Through skilled artistic performance, the audience is exposed to carefully constructed stimuli (narrative, imagery, sound, acting) that bypass purely cognitive filters and directly tap into mechanisms of emotional contagion and empathy. The performance makes us feel, rather than merely inviting us to imagine feeling. Ritualistic Engagement: The engagement with tragedy often takes on a ritualistic quality, where the audience collectively experiences and processes difficult emotions within a safe, structured environment. This collective, public performance of emotion reinforces its reality. The 'reality' of fictional events, from this perspective, lies not in their ontological status as existent entities, but in their capacity to be performed and to elicit genuine responses within a real-world inter