命題論 — Aristotle
Title page The Works of Aristotle — On Interpretation, About The Works of Aristotle — On Interpretation, About The Works of Aristotle — On Interpretation, Aristotle 1928 1. (1) The spoken word is a symbol of thought. Ch. 1 (2) Isolated thoughts or expressions are neither true or false. Ch. 1 (3) Truth and falsehood are only attributable to certain combinations of thoughts or of words. Ch. 2. (1) Definition of a noun. Ch. 2 (2) Simple and composite nouns. Ch. 2 (3) Indefinite nouns. Ch. 2 (4) Cases of an noun. Ch. 3. (1) Definition of a verb. Ch. 3 (2) Indefinite verbs. Ch. 3 (3) Tenses of a verb. Ch. 3 (4) Verbal nouns and adjectives. Ch. 4. Definition of a sentence. Ch. 5. Simple and compound propositions. Ch. 6. Contradictory propositions. Ch. 7. (1) Universal, indefinite, and particular affirmations and denials. Ch. 7 (2) Contrary as opposed to contradictory propositions. Ch. 7 (3) In contrary propositions, of which the subject is universal or particular, the truth of the one proposition implies the falsity of the other, but this is not the case in indefinite propositions. Ch. 8. Definition of single propositions. Ch. 9. Propositions which refer to present or past time must be either true or false: propositions which refer to future time must be either true or false, but it is not determined which must be true and which false. Ch. 10. (1) Diagrammatic arrangement of pairs of affirmations and denials, ( a ) without the complement of the verb 'to be', ( b ) with the complement of the verb 'to be', ( c ) with an indefinite noun for subject. (2) The right position of the negative. (3) Contraries can never be both true, but subcontraries may both be true. (4) In particular propositions, if the affirmative is false, the contrary is true; in universal propositions, if the affirmative is false, the contradictory is true. (5) Propositions consisting of an indefinite noun and an indefinite verb are not denials. (6) The relation to other propositions of those which have an indefinite noun as subject. (7) The transposition of nouns and verbs makes no difference to the sense of the proposition. Ch. 11. (1) Some seemingly simple propositions are really compound. (2) Similarly some dialectical questions are really compound. (3) The nature of a dialectical question. (4) When two simple propositions having the same subject are true, it is not necessarily the case that the proposition resulting from the combination of the predicates is true. (5) A plurality of predicates which individually belong to the same subject can only be combined to form a simple proposition when they are essentially predicable of the subject, and when one is not implicit in another. (6) A compound predicate cannot be resolved into simple predicates when the compound predicate has within it a contradiction in terms, or when one of the predicates is used in a secondary sense. Ch. 12. (1) Propositions concerning possibility, impossibility, contingency, and necessity. (2) Determination of the proper contradictories of such propositions. Ch. 13. (1) Scheme to show the relation subsisting between such propositions. (2) Illogical character of this scheme proved. (3) Revised scheme. (4) That which is said to be possible may be ( a ) always actual, ( b ) sometimes actual and sometimes not, ( c ) never actual. Ch. 14. Discussion as to whether a contrary affirmation or a denial is the proper contrary of an affirmation, either universal or particular. DE INTERPRETATIONE 1 16 a First we must define the terms 'noun' and 'verb', then the terms 'denial' and 'affirmation', then 'proposition' and 'sentence'. Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as 5 all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. This matter has, however, been discussed in my treatise about the soul, for it belongs to an investigation distinct from that which lies before us. [ 1 ] As there are in the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or falsity, and also those which must be either true or 10 false, so it is in speech. For truth and falsity imply combination and separation. Nouns and verbs, provided nothing is added, are like thoughts without combination or separation; 'man' and 'white', as isolated terms, are not 15 yet either true or false. In proof of this, consider the word 'goat-stag'. It has significance, but there is no truth or falsity about it, unless is or is not is added, either in the present or in some other tense. 2 By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is 20 significant apart from the rest. In the noun 'Fairsteed', the part 'steed' has no significance in and by itself, as in the phrase 'fair steed'. Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns; for in the former the part is in no way significant, in the latter it contributes to the 25 meaning of the whole, although it has not an independent meaning. Thus in the word 'pirate-boat' the word 'boat' has no meaning except as part of the whole word. [ 2 ] The limitation 'by convention' was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun or name—it is only so when it becomes a symbol; inarticulate sounds, such as those which brutes produce, are significant, yet none of these constitutes a noun. 30 The expression 'not-man' is not a noun. There is indeed no recognized term by which we may denote such an expression, for it is not a sentence or a denial. Let it then be called an indefinite noun. [ 3 ] The expressions 'of Philo', 'to Philo', and so on, constitute 16 b not nouns, but cases of a noun. The definition of these cases of a noun is in other respects the same as that of the noun proper, but, when coupled with 'is', 'was', or 'will be', they do not, as they are, form a proposition either